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I. INTRODUCTION
As the 21st century approaches, the global economy faces several
important changes. Erstwhile sanguine investors in Southeast Asian
countries once rushed to purchase properties in Thailand and Malaysia in
order to build factories, offices, and homes.' However, such impressive
economic growth was not sustainable, and the boom days for Southeast Asia
came to an end in 1997, when many financial businesses shut their doors,
and many investors pulled out of the region.2 Although foreign direct
investment in Southeast Asia has not been affected as much as portfolio
investments in that area,3 it is clear that investors are more cautious than
they once were. Indeed, the terms "global financial crisis" and "global
economic crisis" have entered the contemporary lexicon and continue to be a
concern for economists and others alike.4 Meanwhile, Japan is currently
experiencing a recession, but could reemerge a much stronger economic
player, once it addresses its formidable banking crisis. Notwithstanding these
very significant changes in the world economy, another development could
overshadow and also transcend them all. One commentator has predicted that
the introduction of the euro will be "the most important change in the global
economy well into the next century." 5 Another expert has stated that creation
of the euro is "the biggest change in global finance since the dollar surpassed
sterling to become the world's leading currency in the interwar period.
' 6
Unlike other world events that unpredictably affect financial and economic
interests one year and fade away the next, the adoption and maturation of the
new European currency will be enduring phenomena to be scrutinized for
years to come.
I See Vichai Suthamtarikul, The Asian Economic Crisis and Thailand's Prospects
for Early Recovery 2 (Oct. 7, 1998) (a speech delivered in conjunction with the
Frederick K. Cox International Law Center, Case Western Reserve University School
of Law)(on file with the Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law).
2 See id. at 2-3.
3 See Jonathan Karp, India's Bourse Turns Volatile After Skirting Turmoil for a
Time, WALL ST. J., June 23, 1998, at A17 (reporting that India never became the
haven from the financial crisis that some believed it would become, and that it, too,
experienced less portfolio investment).
4 For an example of this phenomenon, see Peter G. Gosselin, Brazil Woes Shake
World Marketplace, BOSTON GLOBE, Jan. 14, 1999, at Al.
5 See Jeffrey E. Garten, The Euro Will Turn Europe Into a Superpower, Bus. WK.,
May 4, 1998, at 30, 30. It is also important to recognize that the creation of the euro
has implications for European cultural identity, because the currency creates a new
symbol for the region, as important as a flag or an army. See Isabel Hilton, E Pluribus
Euro, NEW YORKER, Apr. 27 & May 4, 1998, at 64.
6 C. Fred Bergsten, America and Europe: Clash of the Titans?, FOREIGN AFF.,
Mar.-Apr. 1999, at 20, 22.
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First, this Note seeks to introduce the reader to the wider context within
which the euro finds itself. Second, it identifies the key events that establish
the euro as the new currency within the European Union. Third, it recognizes
that most contracts stipulating amounts in retired currencies will probably be
immune from litigation, but warns that derivatives contracts which specify
former currencies do pose a potential risk. Fourth, this Note describes the
various legislative responses to the threat that the introduction of the euro
could possibly pose to the continuity of contracts. Fifth, it evaluates these
responses in terms of their necessity and adequacy. Lastly, it encourages
lawyers and legislators to carefully address this issue and sets forth several
recommendations.
Fascination with the euro is justified for many reasons. As a result of
monetary union, Europe will become a more united and potent economic
region with almost 20% of the world's trade.7 The euro will compete with the
U.S. dollar as a world currenc Y reserve, and challenge American dominance
in the area of monetary policy. However, the prospect that demand for U.S.
dollars will decrease as compared to demand for other currencies may be
exaggerated by scholars and commentators. If one looks at foreign exchange
reserves over a long time period, a pattern of diversification seems to have
developed. Thus, the threat to the dollar could be more gradual than some
are predicting. 9 Nevertheless, the new currency of Europe stands poised to be
an influential player in the broader world market as well.
The introduction of the euro will have other important effects. Trade
and competition within Europe will increase at a quick pace, because it will
be less complicated to trade products and services across national borders. 10
European companies will feel pressure to become leaner and more efficient,"
as U.S. companies did in the late 1980s and early 1990s. Moreover, mergers
7 See Jorge Pedraza, The Euro Cometh: Bringing Unity or Fratricide?,
COMMONWEALTH, June 5, 1998, at 9. Some see the introduction of the euro as a bald-
faced attempt by some European countries to keep a reunited Germany in check. For a
discussion of this, see Gwynne Dyer, Euro: The Biggest Shift in World Financial
Order, JAKARTA POST, Dec. 30, 1998, available in 1998 WL 22289711 (arguing that
"[the only reason that eleven European countries are getting a single currency next
month is that Germany was reunited nine years ago last month.").
8 See Pedraza, supra note 7, at 9; David R. Francis, Will Euro Create New World
Order?, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Jan. 4, 1999, at 1.
9 See Paul Temperton, The Euro, the Yen, and the Dollar, in THE EURO 160, 162
(Paul Temperton ed., 1997). Indeed, some say that it is unlikely that the euro will
supplant the dollar as the holding currency of government reserves. See Tonya D.
Horton, An Introduction to the Euro, 3 N.C. BANKING INST. 435, 448 (1999) (citing
Patricia Pollard, The Role of the Euro as an International Currency, 4 COLUM. J.
EUR. L. 395, 395-96, 403 (1998)).
1o See Garten, supra note 5, at 30.
" See id.
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will occur more frequently, creating much larger European conglomerates. 2
In fact, mergers in Europe have already increased 48% in 1997, up to a total
of $384 billion.13 If monetary union in Europe indeed does effectuate the
commercial developments that are predicted, the region will reap great
economic benefits.
The adoption of the euro currency necessitates planning on the part of
businesses around the world. Marketing, sales, finance, and legal
professionals will have to implement strategies to make their own transition
to the euro smooth.14 Careful preparation in those and other areas is critical
if companies wish to be ready to transact business with the new, more
unified Europe.
II. A TIMELINE OF EVENTS
Despite the quixotic misconceptions some may hold, European
monetary union requires a lengthy multistage process that will likely be
neither facile nor expeditious. On January 1, 1999, eleven European
countries adopted the euro as their official currency.15 The complete
transition to the euro will take years, but official adoption was the first major
step, at which time the euro first began to coexist with the legacy
currencies 16 such as the Austrian schilling and the Italian lira. Since January
1, 1999, stocks, government bonds, bank account transfers, credit card
payments, and prices have been measured in euros as well as legacy
currencies. 17 Also on this date, exchange rates between the euro and the
12 See id.
13 See Thane Peterson, The Euro, Bus. WK., Apr. 27, 1998, at 90, 92. This trend
is continuing into 1999. American lawyers in the mergers and acquisition area would
be well advised to respond to these developments and position themselves to protect
their clients interests. "The message for Americans is to think of companies in the
new currency bloc as Europeans, rather than French, German, etc., and to develop
partnerships and alliances with acquirers, financiers, and m & a service providers on
the Continent with a pan-European view." Michael L. Sklar & Mark R. Williams,
How the Euro Deals a Stronger Hand to European Buyers, MERGERS & ACQUISITIONS,
Jan.-Feb. 1999, at 23, 24.
14 See Guy D. Billoud, Implications for International Business of European
Economic and Monetary Unification, Bus. ECON., Jan. 1998, at 38; see also Auditors
Warned to Prepare for Euro, ACCOUNTANT, Jan. 1, 1999, at 4, available in 1999 WL
11511252.
15 See Joseph Smallhoover & Bernardine Adkins, Euro Transition Period Poses
Choices, NAT'L L.J., July 27, 1998, at B13. These eleven nations are Austria,
Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands,
Portugal, and Spain. See id.
16 The term "legacy currencies" refers to the individual national currencies used
by countries that will eventually use only the euro.
17 See Peterson, supra note 13, at 92-93.
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legacy currencies were finalized. 18 Before their retirement, the legacy
currencies will either rise in value together, or fall in value together each day,
depending on the exchange rate of the euro. Although this initial three-year
stage involves only the above-mentioned electronic transactions, 19 it ushers in
the momentous shift Europe is making from many currencies to one unified
currency.
Three years later, on January 1, 2002, euro bank notes and coins will be
put into circulation, as the legacy currencies are systematically taken out of
circulation. 20 Beginning then, business can be done in both euros and the
legacy currencies, and merchants will be required to display prices in euros
and legacy currencies. 2 1 Finally, on July 1, 2002, the euro will be the only
currency of legal tender for the adopting nations,2 legacy currencies having
been totally taken out of circulation. The key events and dates in the
transition to the euro provide a helpful context in which to examine specific
international business transactions, such as swaps and derivatives.
111. THE EURO THREAT
A. History Holds No Precedent
Few parallels to the substitution of the euro in place of national legacy
currencies in Europe exist.24 The American colonies did not have a widely
accepted currency, but rather relied on gold or silver coins, tobacco
certificates, land certificates, barter, and beaver skins to accomplish trade.2
After the American Revolution, state banks began issuing bank notes, which,
although not true currency, were the de facto money of much of the 19th
century.26 By 1865, the federal government began to tax the state bank notes
18 See Alkman Granitsas & Shada Islam, Ready or Not, FAR E. ECON. REv., Aug.
27, 1998, at 6, 8.
19 See Edmund L. Andrews, Germans Face Losing a Loved One at Age 50: The
Mark, N.Y. TIMES, June 21, 1998, at 10 (discussing the way in which the Germans at
first resisted relinquishing their beloved mark, but now seem to look more favorably
on the euro).
20 See Smallhoover & Adkins, supra note 15, at B13.
21 See Granitsas & Islam, supra note 18, at 8. This concept is often referred to as
"dual pricing." See, e.g., Smallhoover & Adkins, supra note 15, at B 13.
22 See Granitsas & Islam, supra note 18, at 8.
23 See John Marks, Latest Software Nightmare: The Currency Change in Europe
Could Cost U.S. Firms Billions, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Nov. 17, 1997, at 63.
24 See Clifford R. Dammers, The Euro: Eliminating Legal Uncertainty, in THE
EURO 121, 121 (Paul Temperton ed., 1997).
25 See RdCHARD N. CURRENT ET AL., AMERICAN HISTORY 72 (7th ed. 1987).
26 See id. at 227. By 1860, over 1,500 of these state-chartered banks were in
existence. See id. at 407.
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and effectively wiped them out of existence.27 Thereafter, the federal
government dealt with currency on a national level, in part by printing paper
currency referred to as greenbacks. 28 Due to the multiplicity of mediums of
exchange in the United States, both during the colonial period and the 19th
century, it is difficult to see how a meaningful comparison could be drawn
between the stable, stalwart, and government-backed currencies of our time
such as the German mark or the French franc and the disparate certificates
and bank notes of the 17th, 18th, and 19th centuries. However, the printing
of greenbacks with the simultaneous phasing out of the various state bank
notes of disparate value certainly simplified complex American interstate
business transactions. Similarly, the introduction of the euro will likely
lessen the need for European businesses and investors to consider the relative
value of different European currencies, freeing them up to expend energy
considering other issues. Notwithstanding this, today's complex global
financial, economic, and legal milieu generates and renders possible a host of
issues which could not arise in the much less complicated eras of the 17th
through 19th centuries. 29
B. Most Contracts Unaffected
Fortunately for most financial contracts, such as mortgages and loans,
few (if any) legal issues will arise due to the conversion from European
national currencies to the euro.30 For example, if a borrower obtained a
promissory note in November of 1998 for DM 10,000, payable in November
of 2002 with interest of 5% per annum, she must repay the lender an
equivalent amount of euros when the note becomes due. All of the terms and
conditions of the instrument, including the interest rate and the term of the
loan, are unaffected. The obligation to pay in German marks is simply
converted into euros, based on the established exchange rate.31 From this
perspective, the conversion to the euro doesn't seem to create any problems
whatsoever.
27 See id. at 407; see generally The National Bank Act, Law of June 3, 1864, ch.
106, 13 Stat. 99 (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 38 (1994)).
28 See CURRENT ET AL., supra note 25, at 407.
29 I do not mean to imply that the economic and legal aspects of American history
do not have any instructive lessons for today. However, today's highly complex world
of international business transactions, (e.g. swaps and derivatives), litigiousness, and
supra-national regulation (such as by the International Monetary Fund or World Trade
Organization) poses unexplored questions that have no true analog in history.
30 See Dammers, supra note 24, at 121.
31 For a similar example, see id.
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C. Types of Contracts Most Likely to be Challenged
Despite the ease that some may feel, commentators and scholars are
postulating that three specific types of contracts are likely to be challenged
by one of the parties after the substitution by the euro for the former national
currencies. First, one scholar asserts that long-term supply contracts might
be most often called into question.32 Such contracts probably did not
anticipate the currency of payment would be changed; in fact, many of these
contracts probably have no provisions in them discussing the conversion to
the euro.3 Simply substituting the euro may not be an adequate solution if
the parties had made bargaining assumptions about the value of legacy
currencies that no longer hold true after January 1, 1999. Second, some
experts argue that royalty provisions in licensing agreements pose a
significant risk,34 presumably because they resemble the long-term supply
contracts in which the currency of payment was thought to be fixed and
immutable. Although further research could illumine the risks that the
introduction of the euro poses on these two types of contracts, the focus of
this Note will be on the risks to a third type of contract.
D. Background on Derivatives
There has been much speculation that certain transactions not governed
by European Union law, such as swaps and derivatives, could be particularly
vulnerable to litigation as a result of the new euro currency. 35 It is essential,
therefore, to explore these transactions in greater detail. Derivatives are
defined in economic terms as "instruments whose returns are derived from
those of other instruments., 36 Indeed, the term encompasses many financial
32 See Rebecca H. Marek, Note, Continuity For Transatlantic Commercial
Contracts After the Introduction of the Euro, 66 FORDHAM L. REv. 1985, 2002-03
(1998).
33 See id.
34 See John P. Dunn & Gary T. Johnson, Euro Poses Disclosure Issues for SEC
Registrants, NAT'LL.J., Feb. 9, 1998, at B10.
35 See Howard M. Liebman, Key Considerations to be Taken Into Account in the
Introduction of the Euro, METROPOLITAN CORP. COUNS., Mar. 1998, at 10, 10. One
scholar asserts that derivative contracts are the primary types of contracts that give
rise to continuity of contract issues as a result of the introduction of the euro. See
Andre Fiebig, The Introduction of the Euro and Its Implications for U.S. Legal
Practitioners, 11 DEPAUL Bus. L.J. 257, 267 (1999).
36 Don M. Chance, AN INTRODUCTION TO DERIvATIvEs 2 (4th ed., 1998). The
underlying instruments on which derivatives are based include mortgages,
government-backed securities, stocks, or bonds. See Dominic Bencivenga, Revisiting
Derivatives: CFTC Proposal Sparks Regulatory Turf Battle, N.Y.L.J., June 4, 1998,
at 5.
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instruments, including futures, options, forward contracts, and swaps.37
Typically, there are four purposes of such instruments: 1) to lower funding
costs through diversification of funding sources; 2) to enable better
management of assets and liabilities; 3) to hedge against financial risks; and
4) to speculate.38 The third purpose, hedging, concerns the purchase of an
asset or a collection of assets for the purpose of reducing the risk to which
another investment is exposed.39 This ability of derivatives to protect
investments from fluctuations in the market is perhaps their greatest
advantage, as companies save tremendously by using them.4° The Associated
Press recently reported that "[s]udden changes in the value of the dollar since
the Asian crisis began last year have played havoc with operations of
companies that sell their products overseas or depend on foreign suppliers.'41
Financial lawyers must be keenly aware of financial instruments such as
derivatives because they perform a vital function for many businesses.42
The mechanics of derivatives transactions are not as abstruse as one
might think. First of all, regardless of the type of derivatives contract (e.g.
swaps, futures, etc.), each transaction is exactly that - a contract between a
buyer and a seller.43 Usually an exchange of promises is made, in which the
parties become obligated to exchange stated cash payments. 44 For example,
suppose an automobile wholesaler, X, agrees in March to sell Audis to a
retailer for £11,000,000 in October.4 5 X cannot purchase the cars until
October, when he will get the purchase price from the retailer. X then agrees
to buy the cars for £10,000,000, payable in German marks in October from
the German manufacturer. This arrangement appears reasonable. But if the
value of the mark goes up by 10% between March and October, it will cost
37 See Chance, supra note 36, at 5; Thomas C. Singher, Regulating Derivatives:
Does Transnational Regulatory Cooperation Offer a Viable Alternative to
Congressional Action? 18 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1397, 1400 (1995).
38 See Singher, supra note 37, at 1405-06.
39 See Gregory Connor, Hedging, in THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF MONEY &
FINANCE 299 (Peter Newman et al. eds., 1992); see also THE AMERICAN HERITAGE
DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 837 (Anne H. Soukhanov et al.eds., 3d ed.,
1996).
40 See Singher, supra note 37, at 1409.
41 Michael White, Currency Fluctuations Create Risk, PITTSBURGH POST-GAzETtE,
Dec. 17, 1998, at D6.
42 See generally Schuyler K. Henderson, Derivatives Law as a Niche Area is Dead,
9 J. INT'L BANKING L. 351, 354-57 (1997) (arguing in part that knowledge of
derivatives law will be key to any financial lawyer's practice in the future).
43 See Chance, supra note 36, at 5.
44 See Singher, supra note 37, at 1401.
45 For an example similar to this one, see ROBERT P. ROTELLA, THE ELEMENTS OF
SUCCESSFUL TRADING: DEVELOPING YOUR COMPREHENSIVE STRATEGY THROUGH
PSYCHOLOGY, MONEY MANAGEMENT, AND TRADING METHODS 47 (1992).
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£11,000,000, thereby wiping out X's profit. If the mark does especially well,
then X could even lose money on the transaction! On the other hand, X could
also make a profit on the deal if the value of the mark decreases. X's goal is
not to speculate on the variable foreign exchange rate of the mark and the
pound. X would rather use some transaction to hedge the risk he faces vis-t-
vis the foreign exchange rate. X reckons that he should buy £10,000,000 in
marks on the futures market in order to ensure that he will get his
£1,000,000 profit. X enters into a futures contract in March with Y, a
commercial bank, such that the parties agree to exchange X's £10,000,000
to marks in October, at an exchange rate they specify at the time of
contracting. Amazingly, X has locked in his profit that previously was
vulnerable to exchange rate fluctuations. This example demonstrates that the
value of the futures contract hinges on both the value of the payments made
and the value of the underlying exchange rate between the pound and the
mark. 4
6
Contracts such as this are thought to be vulnerable to litigation because
they either specify legacy currencies or refer to interest rates that are linked
to legacy currencies. Since the underlying purpose of these contracts might
be frustrated by the creation of a supra-national currency, one party could
attempt to void the contract. Despite the skepticism and incredulity of some
towards these assertions, the legal community is taking these potential risks
very seriously.
E. Arguments to Excuse Performance
One of the arguments legal experts have anticipated in connection with
any discussion of the euro and the effect of its introduction on certain
contracts involves impossibility or extreme impracticability of performance.
If a fundamental contract term ceases to exist, or when a contract cannot be
performed in a practical way due to the disappearance of a price term, a
party might be excused from performance. Although the traditional
American common law approach was not to excuse performance of the
parties, even when it became overly onerous, 48 some courts have decided that
when Xerformance is particularly burdensome, it is equitable to excuse a
party. Thus, a disadvantaged party could try to argue that the introduction
46 See Singher, supra note 37, at 1401.
47 See Dammers, supra note 24, at 122.
48 For a classic example of the failure of the impracticability defense, see
International Paper Co. v. Rockefeller, 161 A.D. 180 (N.Y. App. Div. 1914)
(rejecting the defendant's impracticability defense, which was predicated upon the
heightened cost of performance due to a fire).
49 Successful uses of this argument can be found in the common law. See, e.g.,
Mineral Park Land Co. v. Howard, 172 Cal. 289 (Cal. 1916).
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of the euro results in changed circumstances that justify the excuse of their
contractual obligations.
50
Impossibility or extreme impracticability are not likely to be winning
arguments for parties to derivatives contracts, for many reasons. First, the
conversion from many European currencies to a single European currency is
a foreseeable event that tends to negate the notion that the parties entered
into the contract unaware that such an event could substantially change an
essential part of their bargain. Secondly, while it may be true that German
marks and Italian lira will soon cease to exist, another currency will be
taking their places. While it may be strictly impossible to perform a
derivatives contract after a certain date by referring to rates of deposit
expressed in the legacy currencies, parties can substantially perform by
referring to the new and perfectly commercially acceptable euro currency. As
one commentator has said, "[t]he substitution does not make performance of
the payment obligation impossible. It permits performance by a substitute
method.' '51 Courts would be unlikely to excuse performance of derivatives
contracts based solely on the argument that the introduction of the euro
renders performance of contracts containing references to rates of deposit
expressed in legacy currencies extremely impracticable or impossible.
A second argument might be brandished by parties seeking to escape
derivatives contracts after the euro has been introduced. American case law
demonstrates that an unforeseen event nullifying the fundamental purpose for
performing a contract can void a party's duty. of performance.52 This
argument does not hinge on the fact that the contract cannot literally be
performed. Instead, it revolves around whether an event such as the
introduction of the euro currency could frustrate one party's fundamental
reason for entering into the contract in the first place. Moreover, the
Restatement of Contracts has affirmed this case law through section 265:
Where, after a contract is made, a party's principal purpose is
substantially frustrated without his fault by the occurrence of an event
the non-occurrence of which was a basic assumption on which the
contract was made, his remaining duties to render performance are
discharged, unless the language or the circumstances indicate the
contrary.
53
The United States isn't the only jurisdiction where the threat of
litigation concerning frustration of purpose has been anticipated. English law
'0 See Marek, supra note 32, at 2003.
51 Michael Gruson, The Introduction of the Euro and its Implications for
Obligations Denominated in Currencies Replaced by the Euro, 21 FORDHAM INT'L L.J.
65, 92 (1997).
52 See id. at 93 (citing Bank of America Nat'l Trust and Savings Ass'n v. Envases
Venezolanos, S.A., 740 F. Supp. 260, 266 (S.D.N.Y. 1990).
53 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 265 (1981).'
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provides that any event that makes a contract impossible to fulfill can legally
frustrate it.54 Moreover, even E.U. legislation allows for claims of frustration
when an event "fundamentally alters the contract's commercial nature.,
55
Although such an argument may not persuade a court when a simple
contract is involved, more complex and varying circumstances might
persuade a court to agree with it.
IV. LEGISLATIVE AND CONTRACTUAL RESPONSES TO CONTRACTS
DENOMINATED IN LEGACY CURRENCIES
Many countries have taken action of some form or another regarding
the continuity of contracts during and after the substitution of the euro for
the previous legacy currencies. No attempt is made here to address all of
them. Rather, a few representative legislative responses have been culled out
for examination.
A. European Community Law
There are two specific pieces of European Union legislation that have
been written to address the legal framework for the introduction of the
euro.56 The first one was enacted in 1998 57pursuant to Article 1091(4) of the
Maastricht Treaty,58 and is sometimes referred to as the "Article 1091(4)
Regulation 59 (Regulation 1091(4)). The second piece of legislation is
referred to as Council Regulation 1103/97 (Regulation 1103/97), and was
passed pursuant to Article 235 of the Treaty establishing the European
Community on June 17, 1997. 60 Both of these regulations perform critical
functions in the European Commission's effort to minimize legal problems
resulting from the introduction of the single currency.
54 See Wolfgang Munchau, European Age of Uncertainty, FIN. TIMES (London),
Mar. 25, 1997, at 30; Smallhoover & Adkins, supra note 15, at B13.
55 Smallhoover & Adkins, supra note 15, at B13.
56 Jan Meyers & Damien Levie, The Introduction of the Euro: Overview of the
Legal Framework and Selected Legal Issues, 4 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 321, 335 (1998).
57 See Council Regulation 974/98 of 3 May 1998 on the Introduction of the Euro,
1998 O.J. (L 139) 1-5, [hereinafter Council Regulation 974/98].
58 See id.; Resolution of the European Council of July 7, 1997 on the Legal
Framework for the Introduction of the Euro, 1997 O.J. (C 236) 7.
59 See, e.g., THE EURO app. at 275 (Paul Temperton ed., 1997).
60 See Dammers, supra note 24, at 122; Council Regulation No. 1103/97 of 17
June 1997 on Certain Provisions Relating to the Introduction of the Euro, 1997 O.J.
(L 162) 1, 1 [hereinafter Council Regulation 1103/97].
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1. Regulation 1091(4)
It may not be clear to the reader why the European Commission needed
two different regulations to accomplish similar legislative goals. The
European Commission sought to find a legal foundation for its regulations in
Article 1091(4) of the Maastricht Treaty,61 which permits the adoption of
"measures necessary for the rapid introduction of the euro." 62 That article,
however, requires the participating member states to be ascertained in order
for it to form the legal basis of subsequent legislation.63 Subsequently, the
Commission divided up the legal framework into two sections: one to be
based on Article 235, thereby allowing swift action on certain pressing legal
matters, even in the absence of a clear determination of the participating
member states, and the other to be based on Article 1091(4) of the Maastricht
Treaty for issues not of a pressing nature. 64
Regulation 1091(4) has several important effects. First, Article 2 and
Article 3 establish that the euro will be the currency for participating
European States and that the national currencies will in effect be substituted
by the euro currency according to the conversion rates.65 Second, Article 6 of
the regulation provides the following vis-A-vis the transition period between
January 1, 1999 and January 1, 2002: "Where in a legal instrument
reference is made to a national currency unit, this reference shall be as valid
as if reference were made to the euro unit according to the conversion
rates." 66 Thus, legal instruments such as contracts can refer to either the euro
or the national currencies during the transition period. Parties can
denominate in euro amounts, because the euro has been established as the
currency of the European Member States under Article 2.67 Parties can also
denominate their contracts in national or legacy currency amounts, because
Article 6 validates such references as if they were made in the new euro
currency. 68 For contracts that are entered into before January 1, 1999, any
amounts in national currencies will not be altered, since parties are still free
to specify amounts in national currencies throughout the transition period
ending January 1, 2002.69 However, Article 14 provides that after the
transition period ends, references in new contracts to amounts in national
61 See European Commission, Legal Framework for the Use of the Euro, EURO
PAPERS, Sept. 1997, at 2.
62 See Treaty on European Union, art. 1091(4), 1992 O.J. (C 191) 1, 21.
63 See id.
64 See European Commission, supra note 61, at 2.
65 See Council Regulation 974/98, supra note 57, arts. 2, 3.
66 Id. art. 6(2).
67 See European Commission, supra note 61, at 3-4.
68 See Council Regulation 974/98, supra note 57, art. 6(2).
69 See European Commission, supra note 61, at 4.
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currency units will be viewed as references to the euro.70 Although not a
complete handbook of laws regarding the effects of the new currency on
contracts, Regulation 1091(4) establishes a few foundational ideas upon
which other laws can be based.
2. Regulation 1103/97
As mentioned previously, Regulation 1103/97 was enacted in an
expeditious fashion, in order to allay the urgent fears of those in the financial
markets who demanded a greater level of legal certainty and transparency
regarding the introduction of the euro and its consequences. 7' It is binding
upon all European Union members, regardless of whether they adopt the
single currency or retain their own national currencies.
72
Article 3 of this regulation provides that the introduction of the euro
will neither: 1) modify any term of a legal instrument; 2) excuse the
performance of any party under any legal instrument; nor 3) grant a right to
a party to modify or terminate any legal instrument.73 Also of critical import
in Regulation 1103/97 is the Council's definition of "legal instrument" which
explains the term as "legislative and statutory provisions, acts of
administration, judicial decisions, contracts, unilateral legal acts, payment
instruments other than banknotes and coins, and other legal instruments with
legal effect." 74 Some commentators state that this definition was intentionally
broad, in order to include all types of contracts and agreements. 75 In a
similar vein, Article 3 also provides that this continuity of contract provision
is "subject to anything which parties may have agreed. 76 As a result, parties
can override the continuity of contract clause of Article 3 by modifying their
contracts to fit their own special circumstances.77
B. New York State
In 1997, the New York legislature amended its General Obligations
Law, also known as Title 16, to address the continuity of contract issue vis-
h-vis the introduction of the euro.78 It provides that the euro is deemed a
"commercially reasonable substitute and substantial equivalent" whenever
70 See id. at 7.
71 See Dammers, supra note 24, at 122; European Commission, supra note 61, at
7.
72 See Munchau, supra note 54, at 30.
73 See Council Regulation 1103/97, supra note 60, art. 3.
74 Id.,art 1.
75 See Dammers, supra note 24, at 123.
76 See Council Regulation 974/98, supra note 57, art. 8.
77 See Meyers & Levie, supra note 56, at 340.
78 See Gruson, supra note 51, at 100.
2000]
CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L.
contracts refer to a legacy currency that has been replaced by it.79 Moreover,
the law also provides that the introduction of the euro does not trigger
discharge or excuse of performance obligations under any contract, or "give
a party the right to unilaterally alter or terminate any contract, security or
instrument." 80 The rule applies to situations where a party pays an obligation
in euros, but the debt was specified in a currency which was replaced by the
euro. It also applies when a security or instrument makes "reference to [an]
interest rate or other basis [that] has been substituted or replaced due to the
introduction of the euro and that is a commercially reasonable substitute and
substantial equivalent., 81 Section 5-1603 ensures that agreements between
parties to a contract regarding the introduction of the euro and its effect will
not be altered by Title 16.82 Finally, the law also provides in section 5-1604
that Title 16 applies to all contracts with respect to commercial transactions,
including securities.83
Other states have also dealt with this issue, most notably Illinois and
California. The Illinois statute is almost identical to the New York law,
84
while the California law omits only two provisions contained in the laws of
New York and Illinois.85 The differences that exist are not significant
because the essential provisions of all three states' laws are practically
identical.
C. Protocol by the International Swaps & Derivatives
Association (ISDA)
The International Swaps & Derivatives Association is an association of
financial institutions that transact business involving swaps agreements and
derivatives contracts.86 The ISDA designed a new industry guideline, called
the EMU (European Monetary Union) Protocol (the Protocol), which
establishes a standard and quick system to allow parties to change the terms
to which they agreed. 87 The Protocol is designed for all banks, corporations,
governments, investment firms, insurance companies, and others who are
parties to swaps or derivatives contracts already governed by other ISDA
79 N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 5-1602(1)(a) (McKinney Supp. 1999).
80 Id. § 5-1602(2).
81 Id.
82 See id. § 5-1603.
83 See id. § 5-1604.
84 See Euro Conversion Act, 815 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 617/10-617/30 (West
Supp. 1999).
85 See CAL. CIV. CODE § 1663 (West Supp. 1999).
86 See Schuyler K. Henderson, Swap Credit Risk: A Multi-Perspective Analysis, in
CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS IN INTERNATIONAL BANKING AND CORPORATE FINANCIAL
OPERATIONS 40, 47 (Koh Kheng Lian et al. eds., 1989).




agreements. By participating in this Protocol, parties to derivatives
contracts are in essence amending existing contracts to account for the new
currency. 89
The Protocol accomplished several objectives. First, it provides that
contracts already in force will continue to be honored, even though the euro
will replace eleven European currencies. 90 Second, the Protocol will also
create five "fallback methods" to be used by the parties to decide upon new
price sources when the legacy currencies disappear.91 For example, when a
derivatives contract specifies a rate for deposits in a legacy currency, a
fallback provision is needed once the rate is no longer available. In this case,
the first fallback provision will allow parties to use rates for deposits in
euros, if they appear on the same page on which the previous rates were
listed.92 Third, in addition to falback provisions, the Protocol also reiterates
that by agreeing to abide by it, parties incur valid and binding legal
obligations.93
V. EVALUATION OF THE LAWS
A. Necessity of Legislation
Arguments can be made for and against the necessity of pieces of
legislation such as Regulation 1103/97 and section 5-1602 in New York.
Before these arguments are considered, it is important to discuss some of the
basic policy objectives that laws such as these might address. The law is not
an end in itself; compelling reasons do exist for having it. From an economic
perspective, market agents need clear signals about how the law will handle
certain contractual issues. 94 If market agents lack such assurances, market
failures and higher transaction costs could result. 95 Similarly, parties to
88 See International Swaps and Derivatives Association, Inc., EMU Protocol
FAQ's (visited Feb. 6, 1999) <http://www.isda.org/emufaq> (providing a primer for
all those interested in the Protocol, its mechanics and provisions, and how to
participate in it).
'9 See id.
90 See Bencivenga, supra note 36, at 5.
91 See id. International Swaps & Derivatives Association., Inc., EMU Protocol,
Annex 2 (visited Sept. 12, 1999) <http://www.isda.org/emutext.html>
(acknowledging that the introduction of the euro might cause the underlying rates,
upon which many derivatives contracts are based, to be unavailable and listing the
various fallback provisions).
92 See id.
93 See id. § 3(e).
94 See European Commission, supra note 61, at 8.
95 See Randy E. Barnett, A Consent Theory of Contract, 86 COLuM. L. REV. 269,
282 (1986) (arguing in part that the acts of government legal institutions can be
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contracts (such as market participants and governments) should be afforded
greater transparency of the law whenever questions exist regarding how the
law will treat an issue. Otherwise, there could be a reluctance to enter into
contracts at all, or alternatively a persistent worry that contracts might not
be enforceable. However, sometimes parties can create private strategies that
can substitute for the law and the legal system in an efficient way.96 The law
must be careful, therefore, not to intervene when private strategies alone can
bring about efficiency.
Few (if any) scholars or commentators criticize the European Council's
decision to adopt a regulation setting up the legal framework for the new
euro currency. After all, such a law is justified under the principle of lex
monetae, which establishes that all nations as a sovereign matter can change
their currency, and other nations must honor any such change.97 On that
basis, it is in Europe's interest to adopt laws regarding its new currency,
such that a lex monetae will exist to which courts may turn for guidance
regarding contractual issues.98 It was theoretically possible for Europe to
adopt its common currency without having legislated on the matter of
contractual continuity. However, European monetary union entails many
different nations agreeing to adopt a common currency. The substantive civil
(or common) law of contracts in those nations likely contains many
variations, such that claims of frustration, impracticability, etc. could have
varying degrees of success, depending on where in the European Union
parties litigate. For this reason, it was vital for the European Council to send
a clear signal that the introduction of the euro would not trigger such
contract doctrines as frustration of purpose or impracticability. If such a law
did not exist, there would be a great possibility for market failures, since
parties would be much more reluctant to enter into contracts and higher
transaction costs would have to be paid, in terms of bargaining and
negotiation to ensure enforceability. Along these lines, market participants
that face higher transaction costs might decide to deal with those negative
externalities by shifting those costs to others, which can also lead to market
failures. Without the law, financial institutions could face an adverse
selection problem, in that they will feel constrained to be more cautious in
responsible for increasing transaction costs, thus discouraging parties to enter into
contracts).
96 See, e.g., Avner Greif, Contract Enforceability and Economic Institutions in
Early Trade: The Maghribi Traders' Coalition, 83 AM. ECON. REv. 525, 544-45
(1993) (arguing in part that nonmarket institutions can be successful in making
market transactions efficient even in the absence of a law-supplied rule).
97 See Dammers, supra note 24, at 121.
98 The principle of lex monetae applies also to cases where many countries adopt a
common currency, because the nations are still exercising sovereign rights to change
their currencies, even if one common currency results.
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"writing a contract." 99 However, with the law, the legal risks to parties such
as financial intermediaries are decreased, thereby giving them a greater
incentive to participate in such transactions. Therefore, the necessity of
continuity of contract legislation in Europe is not questioned very much.
However, in non-European Union jurisdictions, scholars and
commentators are divided about the need for continuity of contract laws to
address the introduction of the euro. Many agree that outside the European
Union, common law contract principles such as frustration, impracticability,
or impossibility will not trigger excuse or discharge of contractual
obligations due to the conversion of the price term from national currency
units to euro units.1' This ought to placate the market, one might think.
Moreover, the doctrine of lex monetae is accepted in jurisdictions of the
main financial centers of the world.101 Those centers have a vested interest in
the recognition of the euro and the preservation of existing and future
contracts that denominate amounts in euros as well as legacy currencies.102
These considerations support the notion that continuity of contract legislation
is wholly unnecessary outside the European Union, a position that at least
one scholar has taken.103 However, other commentators argue that any level
of uncertainty about the continuity of contracts denominated in euros or
replaced European currencies is unacceptable to the financial markets of the
world.104 The Financial Law Panel, a London-based group, has concluded
that despite the existence of regulations in the European Union to address the
continuity of contracts, under existing law, Singapore courts would be
particularly reluctant to enforce contracts denominated in legacy
currencies. 105 Where does this leave us, then?
The laws that have been enacted by New York and other jurisdictions in
response to the Euro threat are necessary, despite the fact that ordinary
contract principles will probably not allow parties to escape their contractual
obligations. Many (if not most) parties admittedly will not even consider
trying to avoid their contractual obligations simply because the agreed-upon
99 In this case, banks play the role of speculator in which they are the ones
assuming the risk. That is what is meant by "writing a contract."
100 See Meyers & Levie, supra note 56, at 341-42; Gruson, supra note 51, at 95.
101 See European Commission, supra note 61, at 9.
102 See id. "The continuity issue is of utmost concern to participants in
international financial markets, where the equivalent of trillions of dollars are
transacted electronically every day." James H. Freis, Jr., Continuity of Contracts
After the Introduction of the Euro: The United States Response to European
Economic and Monetary Union, 53 Bus. LAw. 701, 702 (1998).
103 See Gruson, supra note 51, at 105-06.
104 See Meyers & Levie, supra note 56, at 341-42.
105 See Freis, supra note 102, at 707-08 (citing FINANCIAL LAW PANEL, ECONOMIC
AND MONETARY UNION: CONTINUITY OF CONTRACTS OUTSIDE THE EUROPEAN UNION,
THE POSITION UNDER THE LAW OF SINGAPORE 22 (July 1998)).
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price term or reference rate of deposit is being converted to euro units. After
all, parties enter into contracts because they believe they will receive a gain
as a result. However, some parties will be disadvantaged by changing
circumstances that were unknown at the time of contracting. Some will argue
to escape their contracts, and some are probably going to use the
introduction of the euro as a basis for their argument. The law should not
accept this argument. Although some contracts are more susceptible to this
type of argument than others, derivatives contracts are especially vulnerable.
Parties to such contracts must be protected. When high stakes are involved,
even a small amount of uncertainty in the parties' minds could cause them to
avoid the perceived risky transaction. This result is unacceptable because the
benefit to businesses that derivatives contracts provide is indispensable to
our economy. Granted, the swaps and derivatives markets have only
relatively recently assumed greater prominence and influence in the global
economy. 106 Yet, a jurisdiction's failure to enact legislation to allay the fears
of those in this growing sector of the financial world could send a signal that
such contracts may or may not be revocable. For these reasons, it is vital to
have legislation to ensure the enforceability of contracts affected by the
introduction of the euro.
B. Adequacy of Legislation
The laws enacted by the European Council and the states of New York,
Illinois, and other jurisdictions adequately protect parties to most contracts.
The introduction of the euro does not change the commercial rationale in
those instances; the new currency is only of incidental import.
Notwithstanding this, other contracts (such as derivatives contracts) do
have a commercial rationale that is considerably affected by a change in the
currency unit. A buyer may have chosen to enter into a certain transaction
for the purpose of hedging against fluctuations in the value of the mark. The
seller, meanwhile, may have considered the market and decided that the
transaction would turn out profitable to her. When the time comes for
performance, the buyer may discover that the benefit of his bargain has been
stripped away by the conversion of the marks into perceived weaker euros.
Given the loss felt by the buyer, he will seek to avoid this result by bringing
an action to rescind the contract because it has been frustrated due to the
introduction of the euro. These specialized contracts might then legitimately
be frustrated in some sense by the currency change, and courts might decide
to discharge the contractual obligations of the parties, since the claim of
frustration has more legitimacy.10 7 Since this very real possibility exists in
106 See generally J. ORLIN GRABBE, INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL MARKETS 26-27 (3d
ed. 1996) (providing a brief financial and economic world history from 1973 to the
globalization of economies in the 1990s).
107 See SmalIhoover & Adkins, supra note 15, at B13.
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the context of derivatives transactions notwithstanding the existing
legislation, the issue must be addressed in some fashion.
While the current euro conversion laws technically are meant to apply
to all contracts, the provisions are inadequate to protect parties to derivatives
contracts. As discussed in Part IV, the International Swaps & Derivatives
Association has created a Protocol in response to this deficiency, instituting a
framework within which parties can determine new price sources when the
currencies mentioned in their contracts cease to exist as such.108 Parties that
adhere to the Protocol now can feel secure that their contracts, as amended,
have resolved the issue. That contractual solution holds much promise for
resolving legal ambiguity. Yet, this Protocol may not be enough to persuade
prospective parties that it is safe to enter into derivatives contracts. Without
specific legislation to address the dangers perceived by the market, this lack
of transparency could lead to inefficient, undesirable results. The high cost
of determining whether derivatives contracts are enforceable could deter
parties from pursuing them at all. Moreover, ambiguity in the law could
induce some to speculate in derivatives contracts involving European
currencies in a way that reflects a moral hazard. Despite the fact that the
ISDA Protocol is an industry standard, there are bound to be free riders who
will try to avoid its reach, and renege on their contractual agreements.
Although the ISDA Protocol provides a helpful means by which parties can
reform their contracts, it does not completely solve the larger problems of
transparency and inefficiency that need to be resolved through more specific
legislation.
VI. AN APPEAL TO LAWMAKERS AND LAWYERS
First, other jurisdictions should adopt laws at least as specific as
Regulation 1103/97 and section 5-1602 of the New York statute. Legislative
bodies in New York, Illinois, and the European Union have at least
addressed this important issue to some degree, and other states should follow
suit. Moreover, it is appropriate for all countries to legislate in this area, as
financial markets are becoming more and more global. No country should
consider itself unaffected by this conversion; the law should guard against
litigation risks like these, no matter how remote they may seem to be. At
some point, parties outside the jurisdictional bounds of New York or the
European Union might be faced with a dispute like this, and they will either
be relieved to discover that thoughtful legislators passed a law to protect
them, or they will be furious to discover that parties in other nations are
protected, while they are not. However, countries like Japan, China (Hong
Kong), Singapore, and Bahrain face the greatest risk of litigation, due to
their status as financial and eurocurrency centers. 109
101 See Bencivenga, supra note 36, at 5.
109 See GRABBE, supra note 106, at 219-21.
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Second, wherever derivatives, swaps, and similar financial agreements
are executed, there is an even greater need for the law to protect the parties
against claims of impossibility and frustration of contract. It would be
appropriate for lawmakers who are still considering the adoption of
legislation to address the continuity issue specifically as it pertains to these
transactions. Agreements like the EMU Protocol concerning continuity of
contracts play an important role in soothing the fears of banks and
companies that use these agreements to hedge against currency market
fluctuations. Undoubtedly some parties may choose to adhere to the
Protocol, while others might find an alternative solution. However, although
an industry standard and a binding obligation among those who adhere to it,
the Protocol does not carry the force of law. It would be better if euro
conversion statutes adequately discouraged renegade derivatives dealers from
taking advantage of gaps in the law, by specifically codifying provisions
such as those in the Protocol. Only in that way can the market properly limit
the free rider problem that may result.
Third, whenever state law (or federal law, where applicable) is unclear
about the enforceability of contracts during and after the transition to the
euro, lawyers for affected parties should try to revise their contracts to
prevent issues from arising. 0 Indeed, lawyers have argued that companies
should not trust law making bodies to enact laws that will protect them,
because inevitably some parties will view the euro conversion as an
opportunity to escape contractual agreements."' Although the law acts as a
safeguard for parties that have not contemplated the law, it would be more
efficient in some cases for parties to expend resources through transaction
costs in order to gain the benefit of greater certainty that their bargain will be
enforceable. Lawyers for companies using derivatives contracts should be
ready to advise them in these matters and assist them in drafting appropriate
contract clauses, such that legal uncertainty can be minimized.
VII. CONCLUSION
Although most discussions of European monetary union assume that the
venture will be a success, doubters and critics vociferously disagree. One
skeptic has said that "[m]onetary union is a crazy project. It creates
deflation. That's why the currency will be a disaster."'" Some fear exists
that the euro could collapse and thereby trigger a worldwide financial and
trade crisis." 3 Holders of euros in that case would then rush to unload their
euros and buy dollars. 14 Such a currency failure could herald a step back for
110 See Dunn & Johnson, supra note 34, at B10.
11 See Geanne Rosenberg, Liability May Lurk in Euro Conversion, NAT'L L.J.,
June 1, 1998, at B1.
112 Peterson, supra note 13, at 94 (quoting Emmanuel Todd, a French philosopher).
113 See Garten, supra note 5, at 30.
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a Europe trying to overcome its tumultuous history of tension and national
rivalries." s
As we wait to see the full impact of the euro on the world, lawmakers
and lawyers need to be addressing key contractual issues, in order to ensure
that potential negative scenarios envisioned by skeptics are not further
complicated by their failure to act.
114 See id.
115 See id.
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